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Abstract
A number of heterogeneous items are to be sold to several bidders. Each bidder demands at most one item. The price of each item is not
completely flexible but restricted to some admissible interval. Due to price rigidities, a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. To facilitate the
allocation of items to the bidders, we propose an efficient ascending auction with rationing that yields a constrained Walrasian equilibrium
outcome in a finite number of steps.
© 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Economists have extensively studied market environments
wheretheremayberestrictionsonthepricesofcommoditiesand
services. There are many economic or political reasons for the
existence of price rigidities. For instance, to prevent breakdown
of stock markets, often ceilings and floors are imposed upon the
price of each stock; price controls are used to reduce inflation or
deflation; and minimum wages are employed to protect certain
groups of the society; see for example, Drèze (1975), Dehez and
Drèze (1984), Cox (1980), Laan van der (1980), Kurz (1982),
Azariadis and Stiglitz (1983), Weddepohl (1987), Herings et al.
(1996) among many others. When there are fixed prices or price
rigidities, rationing is needed to restrict how much agents are
allowed topurchaseor sell.As aresult,rationing will helpprices
to facilitate the distribution of commodities among agents.
However, efficiency cannot be fully attained in general.
While the literature has focused almost entirely on economic
models with divisible goods, we will study the efficient
allocation of heterogeneous indivisible goods such as houses
or apartments among several agents. Each agent demands at
most one item. The price of each item is restricted to an
admissible interval and thus is assumed to be not perfectly
flexible. The lowest admissible price of an item can be seen as a
reservation price, while the highest admissible price of an item
may be exogenously given by the governmentfor the purpose of
either preventing speculation or protecting low-income families
so that they can afford to buy necessary goods, such as an
apartment. In such a market economy, a Walrasian equilibrium
usually fails to exist. To facilitate the allocation of items to the
bidders (or agents), we propose an ascending auction with
rationing that produces a constrained Walrasian equilibrium
outcome.Theauctioneerstartswiththelowerboundpricevector
that specifies the lowest admissible price for each item, and each
bidder responds with a set of items demanded at those prices.
The auctioneer adjusts prices upwards for a minimal set of over-
demanded items and chooses randomly a winning bidder for an
item if this item is demanded by several bidders and its price has
reached its highest admissible price. We prove that the auction
finds a constrained Walrasian equilibrium outcome in a finite
number of steps.At such an equilibrium a bidder can be rationed
on his demand for an item if the price of the item is on its upper
bound, if the item is assigned to some other bidder, and if he will
demand the item when the rationing is removed from him.
Moreover,if an item is not assigned in equilibrium its price must
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beon itslower bound.The auction canbeseenas avariantofthe
auction of Demange et al. (1986) for selling multiple items
without price rigidities. Another related mechanism is due to
Crawford and Knoer (1981). Maskin (2000) studied an auction
for the allocation of one item when buyers may be significantly
budget-constrained.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model.
Section 3 presents the dynamic auction and establishes the main
theorem.
2. The model
An auctioneer wishes to sell a set of heterogeous items N=
{0, 1,⋯, n}, to a group of bidders M={1, 2,⋯, m}. The item 0
is a dummy good which can be assigned to more than one
bidder. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
auctioneer values every item at zero. Every bidder i∈M
attaches an integer monetary value to each item, namely, each
bidder i has a utility function V
i: N→Z+ with V
i(0)=0. A
feasible allocation π assigns every bidder i∈M an item π (i)
such that no item in N \ {0} is assigned to more than one
bidder. Note that a feasible allocation may assign the dummy
good to several bidders and a real item j≠0 may not be
assigned to any bidder at all. An item j≥1i sunassigned at π
if there is no bidder i such that π (i)=j. A feasible allocation
π⁎ is efficient if Σi∈MV
i (π⁎(i))≥Σi∈MV
i (π(i)) for every
feasible allocation π.
A price vector p a RN
þ indicates a price for every good. The
price of each good j ∈ N \ {0} is not completely flexible and is
restricted to an interval [p
¯
j, p ¯j], where p
¯
j and p ¯j are integers and
0≤p
¯
jbp ¯j. The set
P ¼fp a RNj po ¼ 0;
P pj V pj V ¯ pj;j ¼ 1;:::;ng
denotes the set of admissible prices. The price of the dummy
good is always fixed at zero.
When rationing does not take place, the demand set of bidder
i ∈ M at any price vector p a RN
þ is given by
DiðpÞ¼fj j ViðjÞ pj z ViðkÞ pk for every k a Ng:
A Walrasian equilibrium consists of a price vector p a RN
þ
and a feasible allocation π such that π(i)∈D
i( p) for all i∈M
and pj=0 for any unassigned good j at π. It is well-known that a
Walarasian equilibrium exists in the economy when there are no
price rigidities.
In the case of price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium
may not exist since the equilibrium price vector may not be
admissible. In this case we may introduce a rationing scheme
R
i∈{0, 1}
N for each bidder i∈M with R0
i =1. For i∈M, the
vector R
i dictates which goods bidder i∈M can demand and
which goods bidder i cannot demand, namely, Rj
i=1 means
that bidder i is allowed to demand good j, while Rj
i=0
means that bidder i is not allowed to demand good j. Given
the rationing scheme R




−j will denote that Rj
i is being ignored and bidder i is




bidders' rationing schemes is called a rationing system.




m), the constrained demand set of bidder i∈M is
given by
Diðp;RiÞ¼fj a N j R
i
j ¼ 1 and
ViðjÞ pj ¼ maxfViðhÞ ph j Ri
h ¼ 1gg:
Now we can adapt the classical notion of Walrasian
equilibrium to the current model under price rigidities.
Definition 2.1. A tuple (p⁎, R⁎, π⁎) constitutes a constrained
Walrasian equilibrium if
(i) π⁎ is a feasible allocation, p⁎ is an admissible price




(iii) pj ⁎=p ¯j if π⁎ (i)≠j for all i∈M;







Conditions (i) and (ii) need no explanation. Condition (iii)
says that the price of an unassigned item must be equal to its
lower bound price. Condition (iv) states that a bidder can be
rationed on an item if the item is assigned to some other bidder
and if its price is on its upper bound. Condition (v) says that a
bidder can be rationed on an item only if without rationing on
that item, the bidder will demand the item.
It is well-known (see e.g., Drèze, 1975) that an equilibrium
allocation in a constrained Walrasian equilibrium in economies
with divisible goods is not efficient when there are binding
rationings on purchase or sale. It is, however, easy to show by
example that this observation may not be true for economies
with indivisible goods as studied here.
3. The dynamic auction
We now establish the existence of a constrained Walrasian
equilibrium for the economy under price rigidities.
Theorem 3.1. There exists at least one constrained Walrasian
equilibrium in the model under price rigidities.
We shall design a dynamic auction that can actually find in a
finitenumberofsteps aconstrained Walrasian equilibrium inthe
economy. Roughly speaking, the auctioneer starts the auction at
the lower bound prices of the items for sale. Then the bidders
respond with their demand sets. The auctioneer accordingly
eliminates over-demanded items by increasing their prices or by
a lottery to determine a rationing system so that no price of any
itemovershotsitsupperbound.Theauctionstopswhenthereare
no over-demanded items at which a constrained equilibrium is
shown to exist. As a result, this yields a constructive proof of the
above theorem.
A set of real items S⊆N \ {0} is over-demanded at a price
vectorp a RN,ifthenumberofbidderswhodemandonlyitems
in S is strictly greater than the number of items in S, i.e., |{i∈M |
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D
i(p)⊆S}|N|S|. An over-demanded set S is said to be minimal
if no strict subset of S is an over-demanded set. Now we are
ready to describe the dynamic auction under price rigidities.
Note that in the auction process, since the set of bidders and the
set of items are shrinking, the demand set of each bidder and the
over-demanded sets need to be adapted accordingly.
3.1. The dynamic auction under price rigidities
Step 1: The auctioneer announces the set of items N={0, 1,⋯,
n} for sale, the lower bound price vector p ¯ and the
upper bound price vector p ¯. The bidders, denoted









whether there is any over-demanded set of items at p
t.I f
there is no over-demanded set of items, the auction
stops. Otherwise, there is at least one over-demanded
set. The auctioneer first chooses a minimal over-
demanded set S of items and next checks whether the
price of any item in the set S has reached its upper
bound. Let S ¯:={j∈S | pj
t=p ¯j}. If S ¯ is empty, the
auctioneer increases the price of each item in S by one
unit and keeps the prices of all other items unchanged.
Let t:= t+1 and return to Step 2. If S ¯ is not empty, go to
Step 3.
Step 3: The auctioneer picks an item at random from S ¯ and asks
all bidders who demand the item to draw lots for the
right to buy the item. Then the (unique) winning bidder
gets the item by paying its current price and exits from
the auction. Delete this bidder from M and delete his
won item from N.I fM=0 /o rN=0 /, the auction stops.
Otherwise, let t:= t+1 and return to Step 2.
Before proving the convergence of the auction, we illustrate
by example how the auction actually operates.
Example 1. Suppose that there are five bidders (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
and four items (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) in a market. The lower and upper
bound price vectors are p
¯
=(0, 5, 4, 1, 5), and p ¯=(0, 6, 6, 4, 7).
Bidders' values are given in Table 1.
The auction starts at the price vector p
0=(0, 5, 4, 1, 5). Then











0)={4}. The set S={3} is
a minimal over-demanded set and the auctioneer adjusts p
0 to
p
1=(0, 5, 4, 2, 5). The demand sets and price vectors and other
relevant data generated by the auction are illustrated in Table 2.
In Step 3, the price of item 3 has reached its upper bound 4. The
auctioneer assigns randomly item 3, say, to bidder 2. So bidder 2
gets item 3 by paying 4 dollars and leaves the auction. Then we
have M={1, 3, 4, 5} and N={0, 1, 2, 4}. The auctioneer adjusts
p
3 to p
4=(0, 5, 4, 5). In Step 6, there is no over-demanded set of
items at p
6 and the auctioneer can assign item 2 to bidder 3, item
1 to bidder 4, and item 4 to bidder 5. In the end, bidder 1 gets no
item and pays nothing; bidder 2 gets item 3 and pays 4; bidder 3
gets item 2and pays 4; Bidder 4getsitem 1and pays 5; Bidder 5
gets item 4 and pays 7. Let p⁎=(0, 5, 4, 4, 7), π⁎=(0, 3, 2, 1, 4),
R
1⁎=(1, 1, 1, 0, 1), R
2⁎=(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), R
3⁎=(1, 1, 1, 0, 1),
R
4⁎=(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and R
5⁎=(1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Obviously, (p⁎, π⁎,
R⁎) is a constrained equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2. The dynamic auction finds a constrained
equilibrium in a finite number of steps.
Enunciation. It is clear that the auction will stop at some step t.
Let p⁎ and π⁎ be the price vector and the allocation at step t
generated by the auction. We will show that there is a rationing
system R⁎ such that (p⁎, π⁎, R⁎) constitutes a constrained
Walrasian equilibrium. To achieve this, we construct an
equivalent version of the dynamic auction that yields the
same allocation π⁎ and price vector p⁎ and in addition generates
a rationing system R⁎. At price vector p a RN and rationing
system R, a set of real items S⊆N \ {0} is said to be over-
demanded if the number of bidders who demand only items in S
is strictly greater than the number of items in S, i.e., |{i∈M |
D
i( p, R
i)⊆S}|N|S|. An over-demanded set S is said to be mi-
nimal if no strict subset of S is an over-demanded set. We can
now describe the equivalent version of the dynamic auction
under price rigidities.
3.2. The equivalent dynamic auction under price rigidities
Step 1: The auctioneer announces the set of items N={0, 1,⋯,
n} for sale, the lower bound price vector p ¯ and the
Table 1
Bidders' values on each item
Items 0 1 2 3 4
Bidder 1 0 4 3 5 7
Bidder 2 0 7 6 8 3
Bidder 3 0 5 5 7 7
Bidder 4 0 9 4 3 2
Bidder 5 0 6 2 4 10
Table 2
The data generated by the auction for the example






0 (0, 5, 4, 1, 5) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} {3} {3} {3} {3} {1} {4}
1 (0, 5, 4, 2, 5) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} {3} {3} {3} {3} {1} {4}
2 (0, 5, 4, 3, 5) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} {3} {3, 4} {3} {3} {1} {4}
3 (0, 5, 4, 4, 5) {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 0 / {4} {3} {3} {1} {4}
4 (0, 5, 4, 5) {0, 1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4, 5} {4} {4} {3} {4} {1} {4}
5 (0, 5, 4, 6) {0, 1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4, 5} {4} {4} {3} {2, 4} {1} {4}
6 (0, 5, 4, 7) {0, 1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4, 5} 0 / {0, 4} {3} {2} {1} {4}
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upperbound price vector p ¯. The bidders, denoted by
M={1,⋯, m}, come to bid. The auctioneer sets a
rationing system R with R
i
j=1 for every i∈M and
j∈N and price p:= p
¯
. Let the set Wof winning bidders
and the set O of sold items be empty. Go to Step 2.
Step 2: The auctioneer asks every bidder i to report his demand
set D
i( p, R). The auctioneer sets Rj
i=0 for any bidder
i∉Wand any j∈O\D
i( p, R), and asks such bidder i to
resubmit his demand set at p and this adjusted rationing
system R. Then the auctioneer checks whether there is
anyover-demanded setofgoodsatpandR.Ifthereisno
over-demanded set of items, the auction stops. Other-
wise, there is at least one over-demanded set. The
auctioneer chooses a minimal over-demanded set S of
items and checks whether the price of any item in the set
S has reached its upper bound. Let S ¯:={j∈S | pj=p ¯j}.
If S ¯ is empty, the auctioneer increases in p the price of
each item in S by one unit and keeps the prices of all
other items and the rationing system R unchanged.
Return to Step 2. If S ¯ is not empty, go to Step 3.
Step 3: Theauctioneerpicksanitemj∈S ¯atrandomandasksall
bidderswhodemandtheitemtodrawlotsfortherightto
buy the item. The seller sets Rj
i: =0 for every losing
bidder i who demanded item j. The winning bidder and
his won item j are added to the sets W and O,
respectively, and go to Step 2.
Clearly, both auctions produce the same price vector p⁎ and
the same allocation π⁎. The difference is that the second auction
also produces a rationing system R⁎. Following Roth and
Sotomayor (1990, Section 8.3), it is not difficult to verify that
(p⁎, π⁎, R⁎) is indeed a constrained Walrasian equilibrium.
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